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Hypothesis Testing of Edge Organizations: Specifying 
Computational C2 Models for Experimentation  
 
Abstract 
The Edge represents a fresh approach to organizational design, moving knowledge and power to 
the edges of organizations. But this raises issues in terms of comparative performance with 
respect to alternate organizational designs (esp. military C2). The research described in this 
article represents the first stage of a multi-disciplinary, multi-year investigation into the design and 
efficacy of Edge organizations for current and future, military, mission-environmental contexts. 
Specifically, we employ methods and tools of computational experimentation to compare 
empirically the performance of current and competing organizational forms. This first study begins 
by specifying computational models of Hierarchy and Edge organizations in the C2 domain. 
Rooted firmly in Organization Theory, yet cognizant of military operations, in this article we report 
the bases and results of such specification in considerable detail. We also design an experiment 
to compare explicitly the performance of both Hierarchy and Edge organizations across two, 
contrasting, mission-environmental contexts: Industrial Age and 21st Century. Preliminary, 
experimental results reveal insightful dynamic patterns and differential performance capabilities of 
Hierarchy and Edge C2 organizations. This work suggests immediate results amenable to 
practical application in the Military. And it suggests also an exciting agenda for continued 
research along the lines of this investigation. 
 
Introduction 
The Edge [1] represents a fresh approach to organizational design, which appears to be 
particularly appropriate in the context of modern military warfare. It proposes to capitalize upon 
fully connected, geographically distributed, organizational participants by moving knowledge and 
power to the edges of organizations. This highlights promising opportunities for enterprise 
efficacy. But it also raises issues in terms of comparative performance with respect to alternate 
organizational designs. Modern military organizations in general have adapted and evolved over 
many centuries and millennia, respectively. Hierarchical command and control (C2) organizations 
in particular have been refined longitudinally (e.g., through iterative combat, training and doctrinal 
development) to become very reliable and effective at the missions they were designed to 
accomplish. In contrast, the many putative benefits and comparative advantages proposed for 
Edge organizations remain untested hypotheses at best and naïve speculations at worst.  
Current conceptualizations of Edge organizations [20, 38] are increasing the level of 
precision in defining important concepts for evaluating and comparing Edge and other 
organizational forms. They are beginning to identify key Edge entities and relations. And they are 
proffering self-report and like scales in attempt to operationalize measurable Edge constructs. But 
the “theory” underlying such conceptualizations remains as untested and speculative as in the 
original. Indeed, authors of these current conceptualizations call expressly for testing the claimed 
superiority of Edge organizations. The problem is, few research approaches exist at present to 
examine Edge propositions. For instance, it remains unclear even whether informative 
examples—much less exemplars—of Edge organizations in practice can be identified for study 
(cf. [44]). And attempting to test large-scale military organizations in the laboratory suffers from 
severe problems with external validity [7]. Likewise, modifying one or more operational military 
organizations in the field to take on Edge-like characteristics creates problems with internal 
validity [16].  
Further, current conceptualizations of Edge organizations are limited largely to natural 
language descriptions (e.g., [1, 20]) and static models (e.g., [38]). Descriptions in natural 
language—even from the best writers—retain considerable ambiguity in terms of conceptual 
meaning and interrelations. Many people can use the same words and phrases to mean different 
things. And many different interrelations can be characterized to describe the same phenomena. 
 2
Plus, static models are unable to represent the kinds of rich, dynamic, often emergent behaviors 
that are important for understanding complex organizations and environmental interactions such 
as observed in military C2. 
The research described in this article represents the first stage of a multi-disciplinary, 
multi-year investigation into the design and efficacy of Edge organizations for current and future, 
military, mission-environmental contexts. Specifically, it builds upon recent work in the C2 domain 
[15, 46] to employ computational methods and tools to represent complex, dynamic organizations 
via semi-formal models. Semi-formal, computational modeling can overcome substantial 
ambiguity inherent in natural language description. And it can represent and project dynamic 
behaviors of complex and adaptive organizations. This research stream also draws from the 
science of laboratory experimentation (e.g., see [3, 29]) to compare empirically the performance 
of current and competing organizational forms. In particular, we assess the relative performance 
of the Hierarchy—used to represent current military C2 organizations—and the Edge—purported 
to offer advantages in the 21st century C2 environment. Computational experimentation offers an 
approach to mitigate the limitations of both laboratory and field research [46]. And through 
dynamic performance emulation, it provides the means to evaluate and compare a variety of 
different organizations in practice—even with those that do not yet exist.  
This first study begins by specifying computational models of Hierarchy and Edge 
organizations in the C2 domain. Rooted firmly in Organization Theory for background, yet 
cognizant of military operations for application, in the following section we report the bases and 
results of such specification in considerable detail. We describe then the design of an experiment 
to compare explicitly the performance of both Hierarchy and Edge organizations across two, 
contrasting, mission-environmental contexts: Industrial Age and 21st Century. Preliminary, 
experimental results are reported subsequently. They reveal insightful dynamic patterns and 
differential performance capabilities of Hierarchy and Edge C2 organizations. In the closing 
section, we note multiple contributions to C2 research. We also suggest several insights and 
results that are amenable to immediate practical application. And we reveal several parts of an 
exciting agenda for continued research along the lines of this investigation. 
 
Background 
In this section, we draw from Organization Studies to conceptualize theoretically how the Edge 
organization would compare to other archetypes discussed in the literature. This reflects our 
purposeful, two-step approach to specifying Edge organizations via computational models. In this 
first step, we draw from current conceptualizations of Edge organizations (esp. [1, 20, 38]) and 
look to extant organization theory to root such conceptualizations in the rich and well-established 
literature. Once rooted as such in theory, we identify the organizational archetypes that match 
most closely current conceptualizations of the Hierarchy and Edge organizations for comparison. 
In the second step, we use characterizations of such archetypes for guidance in specifying model 
parameters for representing the organizations computationally. We then revisit and recapitulate 
key propositions of current Edge “theory” that can be used to develop a set of hypotheses for 
testing. This sets the stage for computational experimentation. 
 
Organizational Archetypes 
A great many, diverse organizational forms have been conceived and articulated, over a relatively 
long period of social science investigation. By organizational form, we mean a class of 
organizations with distinguishing characteristics. No single instance of an organization within a 
class matches exactly all class characteristics. But in coherent and discriminating classification 
systems, all instances within a given class share many characteristics with others in the same 
class, and all instances within a given class are more similar to one another than they are to 
instances in different classes. Indeed, in many respects, organizational forms can be viewed 
taxonomically [39], in a manner analogous to how cattle, fish, plants, insects and people can all 
be viewed as very different classes of biological organisms. This enables us to abstract away 
from the details of individual organizations (e.g., Wal-Mart, General Motors, The US Navy) in a 
class and to concentrate instead of common characteristics (e.g., large numbers of employees, 
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numerous geographical locations, many levels of management hierarchy) shared by 
organizations in such class.  
Modeling at the class level as such—through organizational archetypes—increases the 
generalizability of our research. Senge [54, p. 94] describes additional benefits of viewing a 
complex world via abstraction to classes and archetypes.  
 
These ‘systems archetypes’ or ‘generic structures’ embody the key to learning to see 
structures in our personal and organizational lives. The systems archetypes—of which 
there are only a relatively small number—suggest that not all management problems are 
unique, something that experienced managers know intuitively. … Just as in literature 
there are common themes and recurring plot lines that get recast with different characters 
and settings, a relatively small number of these archetypes are common to a very large 
variety of management situations. … [They] reveal an elegant simplicity underlying the 
complexity of management issues.  
 
Key among such additional benefits is the relatively small number of comparable, class-level 
archetypes that can be used effectively to represent and learn about a very large number of 
diverse, instance-level organizations. 
 
Table 1 Sample of Organizational Forms from the Literature 
Organizational Form 
Bureaucracy [62] 
M-Form & U-Form [9] 
Rational & Natural, Closed & Open [53] 
Markets & Hierarchies [63] 
Simple, Machine Bureaucracy, Divisional, Professional Bureaucracy, Adhocracy [41] 
Clans [49] 







Internal Market [37] 
K-linked [2] 




Social Network [34] 
Cluster [23] 
Chaotic [61] 
Organizational Democracy [13] 
Pop-up [27] 
Loose Hierarchies & Democracies [36] 
Knowledge-Flow [43] 
Laminar & Turbulent [18] 
Edge of Chaos [4] 
Power to the Edge [1] 
 
 
A sample of diverse organizational forms reported in the organization studies literature is 
presented in Table 1. The interested Reader is directed to the literary citations and references for 
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elaboration. Notice the last entry denotes the Edge organization representing the focus of our 
present investigation. Within the entries presented in this table, different levels of granularity are 
evident in terms of how general versus specific each particular entry is. For instance, the 
Bureaucracy refers to a single class of organization, as do the Clan, Heterarchy, Technocracy 
and others. A single class as such is useful for modeling only so long as the organizations of 
interest in our study conform to that particular class. Although the Hierarchy, for example, may 
conform relatively well to the class Bureaucracy, the Edge probably will not. Hence a single class 
is likely to be too narrow for our purposes. As another instance, the Open organization refers to a 
broad collection of diverse organizational forms that share characteristics only at a very high 
level. A broad class such as this is useful for modeling only so long as the organizations of 
interest in our study vary across classes. However, both the Hierarchy and the Edge, for 
example, conform to the class Open. Hence a high-level class is likely to be too broad for our 
purposes.  
Alternatively, some entries presented in this table fall in between these levels of 
granularity. Some even include rubrics for differentiating between different organizational classes, 
in addition to characterizing multiple classes within such rubrics. Such approaches include mini-
taxonomies of classes as well as instances of organizational forms, in addition to specifying the 
rules for classifying and differentiating various organizations and forms into and between the 
multiple classes. For instance, Mintzberg [41] develops a rubric for classifying and analyzing a 
wide variety of organizational forms. This rubric centers on the number 5. It includes a typology of 
five organizational archetypes: 1) Simple Structure, 2) Machine Bureaucracy, 3) Professional 
Bureaucracy, 4) Divisionalized Form, and 5) Adhocracy. It also characterizes organizations in 
terms of five elements: 1) operating core, 2) strategic apex, 3) middle line, 4) technostructure, and 
5) support staff. And it outlines five basic mechanisms for coordination: 1) mutual adjustment, 2) 
direct supervision, and standardization of 3) work processes, 4) outputs, and 5) skills. This 
scheme includes also eight design factors: 1) job specialization, 2) training and indoctrination, 3) 
behavioral formalization, 4) unit grouping, 5) unit size, 6) planning and control systems, 7) liaison 
services, and 8) decentralization. This rubric and the associated archetypes provide a suitable 











Figure 1 Organizational Elements and Archetypal Examples 
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Figure 1 summarizes these organizational elements in the upper-left quadrant. The 
strategic apex is shown as a circle at the top of the organization. This is where senior 
management and leadership are accomplished. The middle line is shown as a square below the 
apex. This is where line management takes place. The operating core is shown immediately 
below the middle. This is where the basic product and service outputs of the organization are 
accomplished. On either side of the middle line is the technostructure and support staff. Like the 
middle line, these two elements both sit between the strategic apex and the operating core. But 
as staff organizations, they are not part of the direct line between the apex and core. The 
technostructure is responsible for direct support such as planning, analysis and technology. The 
support staff is responsible for indirect functions such as accounting, legal counsel and building 
maintenance.  
Using these elements arranged as such, different organizational archetypes can be 
depicted and differentiated graphically. For instance, the Simple Structure is depicted in the 
upper-right quadrant. It includes only two of the five elements: 1) strategic apex and 2) operating 
core. Coordination is attained principally through direct supervision. Many small businesses are 
organized as such. In contrast, the Machine Bureaucracy is depicted in the lower-left quadrant, as 
another instance. It includes all five elements, with three elements emphasized in terms of large 
prominence. Specifically, the middle line is depicted using a relatively large square, and both the 
technostructure and support staff are depicted similarly using relatively large circles. This 
depiction represents the relatively many layers of middle management and relatively large size 
and influence of technical and support staffs. Coordination is attained largely through 
standardization of work processes. Many large firms and government agencies organize along 
these lines.  
A third instance includes the Professional Bureaucracy, which is depicted in the lower-
right quadrant. It includes all five elements also. But only the support staff is emphasized in terms 
of a relatively large circle for representation. Here standardization of skills provides the principal 
means of coordination. Many professional corporations (e.g., legal firms, medical offices, 
consultancies) organize in these terms. Using Mintzberg’s rubric for classifying organizational 
archetypes helps us to identify and differentiate a relatively small number of common patterns 
that pertain to a very large diversity of organizations. In this article, we focus exclusively on the 
Hierarchy and Edge: two alternate and contrasting organizational forms conceptualized currently 
for military C2 (see esp. [1]). 
 
Edge Specification 
Here we employ Mintzberg’s classification rubric to specify the Hierarchy and Edge organizational 
forms. These specifications are useful in their own right to ground current conceptualizations in 
organization theory and to indicate similarities and differences with other organizational forms 
through archetypal classification. Table 2 summarizes our classification of the Hierarchy and 
Edge organizations according to this scheme. The first column includes the coordination 
mechanism and eight design factors listed above. Two subfactors are included for specialization: 
horizontal refers to (low) job breadth; vertical refers to (little) job control. The second column lists 
the manner in which the Hierarchy organization corresponds with each design factor. For 
instance, coordination is listed as “work standards.” This suggests that organizational policies, 
standard operating procedures, task checklists, detailed work instructions, technical 
specifications, and like approaches to standardization of work processes play the principal role in 
C2 coordination. Clearly other approaches (e.g., direct supervision, standardization of skills) play 
an important role too. But classification and analysis at the archetypal level seeks to identify the 
principal role. 
Other entries in the Hierarchy column follow similar logic. For instance, horizontal 
specialization is listed as “high.” This depicts the highly specialized, relatively narrow job 
descriptions associated with most military positions. Likewise, vertical specialization is listed as 
“high” also. This depicts the highly controlling nature and detailed focus of military leadership and 
management. High training and indoctrination mirrors the extensive formal training and 
acculturation provided to military personnel, as well as the tremendous internal norming forces 
associated with an organization with negligible avenues for lateral entry. High formalization in the 
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next row corresponds with coordination through work standards and the extensive specification of 
policies, procedures and interactions.  
 
Table 2 Classification of Hierarchy & Edge Organizations 
Design Factor Hierarchy Edge 
Coordination 
 
Work standards Mutual adjustment (Adhocracy) 
Specialization – H  
 
High Low (Simple Structure) 
Specialization – V 
 
High Low (Professional Bureaucracy) 
Training & indoc 
 
High High (Professional Bureaucracy) 
Formalization 
 










Large  Small (Adhocracy) 
Planning & control 
 
Action planning Limited action planning (Adhocracy) 
Liaison 
 
Few Many throughout (Adhocracy) 
Decentralization 
 
Centralized Selective decentralization (Adhocracy) 
Archetype Machine Bureaucracy Professional Adhocracy 
  
Unit grouping is principally by function in the Military. At a very high level, the Military 
reflects a divisional structure (e.g., separate Services for Army, Navy, Air Force; distinct 
commands such as Central Command, Seventh Fleet, Strike Group 3). But within each structure, 
the various units—across all services and commands—are grouped by Napoleonic function (e.g., 
1 – Administration, 2 – Intelligence, 3 – Operations). Further, when examining the organization 
and processes in context of wartime C2, the most appropriate unit of analysis becomes the joint 
task force (JTF; see [43, 44]), which is organized functionally even across Service lines. 
Unit size refers to managerial span of control, which is notably large within the operating 
cores of most military organizations. This is consistent with coordination by standardization of 
work processes and formal behavioral interaction. Mintzberg’s categories for planning and control 
are matched best by action planning in the military C2 context. Many militaries include a specific 
functional organization devoted solely to planning. When considering Galbraith’s [19] 
perspectives on various liaison approaches (e.g., informal, task teams, matrix) in the context of 
the JTF, few such approaches are notable in military C2. Most interfunctional coordination and 
integration takes place within the strategic apex of JTF organizations. For the Military as a whole, 
Mintzberg’s categories for decentralization are matched best by limited vertical, which 
corresponds with our comments above pertaining to the divisional structure. But for our JTF unit 
of analysis, decision-making is very centralized.  
Based on these classifications of the Hierarchy in terms of design factors, the final row in 
the Hierarchy column labels the organizational archetype that corresponds most closely with the 
kind of military C2 organization associated with a JTF: Machine Bureaucracy. As suggested 
above, this ideal type does not represent a perfect fit. For instance, other C2 coordination 
mechanisms associated with the Hierarchy include direct supervision and standardization of 
skills, which fit better with Simple Structure and Professional Bureaucracy, respectively. As 
another instance, high levels of training and indoctrination also fit the Professional Bureaucracy 
archetype better. And we note above how the Military as a whole fits well with the Divisionalized 
Form. But overall, most entries in the table for Hierarchy above correspond closely with those 
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associated with the Machine Bureaucracy archetype, and none of the entries is grossly 
inconsistent with such classification. Our classification of the Hierarchy is consistent also with 
common perceptions articulated in the management and popular press (e.g., the pervasive and 
somewhat pejorative term military bureaucracy). Hence this classification appears to be relatively 
clear and clean. 
Classification of the Edge organization is more difficult. This is in part because the 
military does not organize currently for C2 in terms of edge, and in part because the properties of 
an Edge organization draw from multiple archetypes. Indeed, few examples of Edge 
organizations can be identified in practice (cf. university research, open-source software 
development, soccer teams; see [44]). Further, there is some tension in classifying Edge 
organizations regarding the level at which edgeness applies. For instance, edge clearly does not 
apply to the Military as a whole. Yet several, very small military units today (e.g., SEAL and 
Special Forces teams) depict many edge characteristics. But when we focus on the JTF unit of 
analysis, we are able to complete the classification table with good representational validity and 
fidelity. 
The first entry under the Edge column depicts coordination through mutual adjustment. 
Thompson [58] indicates mutual adjustment as the appropriate coordination approach when tasks 
are reciprocally interdependent. This matches well the nature of how Edge organizational units 
are purported to self-synchronize and adapt agilely to novel environments and varying missions. 
As noted parenthetically in the table, mutual adjustment corresponds most closely with the 
Adhocracy form. But as above, clearly direct supervision will play a part in coordination of Edge 
organizations, as will other approaches (e.g., work standardization, standardization of skills). Yet 
the Edge organization calls for emergent leadership: “Exactly who ‘takes charge’ will differ as a 
function of the characteristics of the individuals and the situation. When the most well suited or 
situated individual or organization is in charge, then the organization can be said to be a 
meritocracy” [1, pp. 184-185]. Combined with self-synchronization and other edge properties, 
mutual adjustment appears to represent the best fit. 
In terms of other design factors, notice that many Edge entries in the table contrast with 
their Hierarchy counterparts. For instance, specialization in both horizontal and vertical 
dimensions is likely to be relatively low. Warriors will be required to exhibit more generalism and 
will be granted greater autonomy and discretion over their tactics and actions. Low behavioral 
formalization follows as well, with standardized jobs unlikely at the operating core of Edge 
organizations. As another instance, unit size will be relatively small, as discrete fighting modules 
combine, synchronize, and recombine in different dynamic patterns in response to varying 
environments and missions.  
Alternatively, some Edge design factors are relatively more consistent with those 
pertaining to the Hierarchy. Training and indoctrination, for instance, is likely to be high in Edge 
organizations, as many aspects of military warfare require knowledge-intensive skills and involve 
a unique organizational culture. In terms of grouping, some functional groups are likely to persist 
in Edge organizations. But they will likely be complemented by what Mintzberg calls “market” 
groupings, which focus more on ends of achieving objectives than on means of producing 
outputs. This is consistent with the military notion effects-based operations (see [24, 56]). Some 
limited action planning will likely comprise C2 in Edge organizations as well, but not to the same 
extent as in the Hierarchy. And some aspects of Edge organizations will clearly remain 
centralized too. But selective decentralization also provides a contrast with the centralized nature 
of the Hierarchy organization. This follows from the autonomy and self-synchronization of 
modular Edge forces.  
In sum, looking at the table entries, the Edge organization reflects aspects of Adhocracy, 
Simple Structure and Professional Bureaucracy. It represents a contrast with the Hierarchy, which 
we classify clearly above as a Machine Bureaucracy. But it does not correspond as cleanly with 
any single archetype. Staying focused on our JTF unit of analysis, and looking to non-military 
examples of Edge organizations (e.g., university research, open-source software development, 
soccer teams), we consider the Adhocracy and Professional Bureaucracy to reflect this 
organizational form best. Hence we label it “Professional Adhocracy” in the table. Clearly this 
classification involves considerable judgment and interpretation on our part. And the Reader is 
invited to develop alternate classifications. But the classifications reported here are rooted 
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theoretically and appear to be consistent with current conceptualizations of Edge organizations—
at least within the levels of residual ambiguity inherent in such, natural language 
conceptualizations. 
 
Edge Propositions and Hypotheses 
Here we revisit and recapitulate key propositions of current Edge “theory” that can be used to 
develop a set of hypotheses for testing in this study. This sets the stage for computational 
experimentation. The key Edge propositions derive principally from [1], as supplemented by [20, 
38, 44, 46]. To supplement our theoretically rooted discussion above, this informs our model 
development with cognizance of military operations. 
The seminal Edge publication [1] articulates both a vision of and rationale for the Edge 
organization and its putative performance advantages over the Hierarchy organization. Drawing 
from this book, we look to identify a set of essential properties pertaining to Edge organizations. 
The quotations below (pp. 170 – 180) help toward this end: 
 
Power to the edge is the principle that needs to be applied to enable NCW [network-
centric warfare] to reach its full potential. … Edge organizations are characterized by the 
widespread sharing of information and the predominance of peer-to-peer relationships. … 
Edge organizations are organizations where everyone is empowered by information and 
has the freedom to do what makes sense. … The goal is not to be able to perform well in 
a particular mission in a particular situation, but to create an organization that is agile. 
 
 
Four points appear key here. First, edge represents an organizing principle. This puts edge on 
par with other organizing principles such as division of labor, coordination, information location 
and information processing (e.g., see [19, 41, 58, 57, 62]). Second, decentralized information 
sharing is stressed. This suggests that the topology for information flows is important to the kinds 
of power flows stressed for Edge organizations. Third, pervasive individual control over decisions 
and actions is noted. Some kind of “invisible hand” that enables markets may be essential to the 
Edge organization. Fourth, agility is noted as a fundamental goal of the Edge organization. This 
suggests that some tradeoffs may be required between performance measures such as cost and 
risk [46], flexibility and control [44], and others (e.g., speed, variety, resilience and efficiency).  
Further, we find many examples from current Edge “theory” that characterize a sharp 
Edge-Hierarchy contrast. For instance, “[given] asymmetries of the 21st century security 
environment, … decrease in the size and cost of weapons of mass destruction and disruption, … 
[and increasing] complexity of military operations” [p. 1], “our legacy force structure and concepts 
of operation are not well suited for the tasks at hand” [p. 2]. The notion that an organization can 
be suited relatively better or worse for some particular mission-environmental context reflects the 
long-standing thrust of Contingency Theory [6, 19, 32, 58]. A similarly consistent statement 
follows: “there was not … a single ‘best’ approach to (or philosophy of) command and control” [1, 
p. 18]. A key objective of this present research centers on determining what mission-
environmental factors contribute to relatively better versus worse comparative performance of 
Edge and Hierarchy organizations. One proposition that appears early follows. 
 
Proposition 1. “Power to the Edge is the correct response to the increased uncertainty, volatility, 
and complexity associated with [21st century] military operations” [p. 6].   
 
Another proposition attempts to prescribe how C2 should approach 21st century warfare. 
 
Proposition 2. “The correct C2 approach depends on [five] factors”: 1) shift from static/trench to 
mobile/maneuver warfare; 2) shift from cyclic to continuous communications; 3) volume and 
quality of information; 4) professional competence; and 5) creativity and initiative [p. 19]. 
 
A third indicates that robust networking is key. 
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Proposition 3. “Given a robustly networked force, any one of the six effective command and 
control philosophies proven useful in the Industrial Age is possible” [p. 32]. 
 
 However, Industrial Age organizing principles and processes are characterized as 
breaking down in the face of 21st century warfare.  
 
The 21st century national security environment is qualitatively different from the security 
environment that nations faced in the Industrial Age. Militaries now need to respond to a 
wider range of potential threats, many that are difficult to assess and many that cannot be 
responded to with conventional military tactics and capabilities. Expectations regarding 
casualties and collateral damage have made it more important to deploy with greater 
information quality and precision. Many operations require that militaries work together 
with a variety of civil and nongovernmental partners. The net result is that military 
planners are faced with more uncertainty with regard to what they need to be prepared to 
do, a more complex set of tasks to accomplish, and less room for error [p. 53]. 
 
Further, knowledge and information play key roles in the Edge organization: “This 
increased access to information provides an opportunity to rethink the ways that we organize, 
manage and control” [p. 71]; “we can … move away from a push approach to information 
dissemination to a post and smart-pull approach” [p. 82]; and “groups that have worked together 
over time and across situations prove to be much faster without having to sacrifice decision 
quality” [p. 92 – 93]. We synthesize these descriptions into a proposition reflecting knowledge and 
information. 
 
Proposition 4. People who work together, over time, and learn to operate in a “post and smart-
pull” environment, will outperform similarly organized and capable people who do not. 
 
 The quality agility is stressed repeatedly across different conceptualizations of the Edge 
organization and 21st century warfare environment (cf. [1, 6]). Agile organizations “are the result 
of an organizational structure, command and control approach, concepts of operation, supporting 
systems, and personnel that have a synergistic mix of the right characteristics” [p.123]. This 
characterization is useful for conceptualizing how to assess the comparative performance of 
Edge and Hierarchy organizations. In particular, six attributes of agility are noted: robustness, 
resilience, responsiveness, flexibility, innovation, and adaptation [p. 128]. The agility 
characteristic of organizations also leads to a performance-oriented, contingency-theoretic 
proposition. 
 
Proposition 5. “The more uncertain and dynamic an adversary and/or the environment are, the 
more valuable agility becomes” [p. 124]. 
 
 Further, in characterizing the Edge organization, we find several useful examples to 
guide our model development and parameterization. For instance: 
 
In the future, platforms will evolve from being networked entities to being nodes in the 
network … in the process, the very notion of the platform will evaporate … satisfied by a 
new approach as a result of a series of transformations consisting of ever larger numbers 
of smaller, dumber, and cheaper components … dynamically reconfigurable packs, 
swarms, or other organizations of highly specialized components that work together … 
less mechanical and more organic, less engineered and more ‘grown’ [p. 169]. 
 
Also, we learn that in a hierarchical organization, “those at the top are at the center and those at 
the bottom are at the edge” [p. 174]. And, “Edge organizations are characterized by the 
widespread sharing of information and the predominance of peer-to-peer relationships” [p. 176]. 
Plus, “the need for the communications and translation functions performed by the middle is 
greatly diminished … with disappearance of stovepipes and the demise of the middle” [p. 177]. 
Moreover, “Edge organizations are organizations where everyone is empowered by information 
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and has the freedom to do what makes sense” [p. 177]. Finally, “the concept of power to the edge 
therefore is about the empowerment of the edge of an organization” [p. 213]. An important 
proposition emerges also from this characterization of the Edge organization. 
 
Proposition 6. “An organization’s power can be increased without significant resource 
expenditures” [p. 172]. 
 
This proposition suggests that Edge organizations may prove to be more effective than Hierarchy 
organizations—in some mission-environmental contexts—without sacrificing efficiency. 
 Each of these characterizations provides guidance, which is informed by operational 
military C2 understanding, for developing computational models to characterize Edge and 
Hierarchy organizations. Such guidance supplements our theoretically grounded discussion 
above and helps us to focus specifically on the Edge conceptualizations and performance claims. 
Each of these propositions provides a claim that can be operationalized and tested 
computationally through our dynamic models. The fundamental claim addressed through this 
study follows. 
 
If power to the edge organizations are … more powerful than current military hierarchies 
… then they must be able to accomplish more, in less time, under more adverse 
conditions, and at lower cost than Industrial Age organizations [p. 214]. 
 
This leads to our fundamental proposition. 
 
Proposition 0. Edge organizations can outperform Hierarchy organizations in demanding mission-
environmental contexts. 
 
Tools and Design for Computational Experimentation 
In this section, we provide a brief overview of the tools used to represent computationally and to 
assess experimentally the comparative performance of Edge and Hierarchy organizations. Much 
has been written elsewhere about the computational tools. The interested Reader is directed to 
the corresponding citations and references below for additional information. We also describe, in 
considerable detail, the experimental design used to specify and test Hierarchy and Edge 
organizations computationally. Two appendices are included as well to supplement this detailed 
description and to provide the interested Reader with sufficient information to replicate our 
models and findings. The goal is to enhance research reliability via such replication. 
 
Computational Tools 
Here we draw from [47] to describe the computational methods and tools used for modeling the 
Hierarchy and Edge organizations. The Virtual Design Team (VDT) Research Program [60] 
reflects the planned accumulation of collaborative research over two decades to develop rich, 
theory-based models of organizational processes. Using an agent-based representation [14, 31], 
micro-level organizational behaviors have been researched and formalized to reflect well-
accepted organization theory [33]. Extensive empirical validation projects (e.g., [11, 59]) have 
demonstrated representational fidelity and have shown how the qualitative and quantitative 
behaviors of VDT computational models correspond closely with a diversity of enterprise 
processes in practice.  
The VDT modeling environment has been developed directly from Galbraith’s [19] 
information processing view of organizations. This information processing view has two key 
implications [28]. The first is ontological: we model knowledge work through interactions of tasks 
to be performed, actors communicating with one another and performing tasks, and an 
organization structure that defines actors’ roles and that constrains their behaviors. In essence 
this amounts to overlaying the task structure on the organization structure and to developing 
computational agents with various capabilities to emulate the dynamic behaviors of organizational 
actors performing work. We model the organization structure as a network of reporting relations, 
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which can capture micro-behaviors such as managerial attention, span of control and 
empowerment. We represent the task structure as a separate network of activities, which can 
capture organizational attributes such as expected duration, complexity and required skills. Within 
the organization structure, we model further various roles (e.g., marketing analyst, design 
engineer, manager), which can capture organizational attributes such as skills possessed, level of 
experience and task familiarity. Within the task structure, we model further various sequencing 
constraints, interdependencies and quality/rework loops, which can capture considerable variety 
in terms of how knowledge work is organized and performed.  
 
Table 3 Representations of Hierarchy & Edge Organizations 




- High centralization 
- High formalization 
- Low matrix strength 
- 3-level hierarchy 
- Command (PM): 3 FTE 
- Coordination (SL): 200 FTE 
- Operations (ST): 40,000 FTE 
- 4, large units 
- Med skill level 
 
- Low centralization 
- Low formalization 
- High matrix strength 
- 1-level meritocracy 
- Command (PM): 0 FTE 
- Coordination (SL): 0 FTE 
- Operations (ST): 40,000 FTE 
- 16, smaller units 





- Vertical channels 
- “Wheel” structure 
- Few communication links 
- Information exchange (0.1) 
- Push communications 
- Low application experience 
- Meetings (2 hr/day, 10%) 
 
- Horizontal network 
- “Circle” structure 
- Many communication links 
- Information exchange (0.9)  
- Post & smart pull 
- Med application experience 
- P2P communications 
Work Structure 
 
- 4 operational tasks 
- Sequential execution (2-Ph) 
- Sequential interdependence 
- FEP (0.1)  
- PEP (0.1) 
- Leader demands extra 
- Work duration (3 months) 
- Loose coupling 
- Rework strength (0.3) 
- Command & staff rework 
 
- 16 operational subtasks 
- Concurrent execution 
- Reciprocal interdependence 
- FEP (0.2)  
- PEP (0.2) 
- Leader demands emergent 
- Work duration (0) 
- Tight coupling 
- Rework strength (0.1) 
- No Command or staff 
 
Also, each actor within the intertwined organization and task structures has a queue of 
information tasks to be performed (e.g., assigned work activities, messages from other actors, 
meetings to attend) and a queue of information outputs (e.g., completed work products, 
communications to other actors, requests for assistance). Each actor also processes such tasks 
according to how well the actor’s skill set matches those required for a given activity, the relative 
priority of the task, the actor’s work backlog (i.e., queue length), as well as how many 
interruptions divert the actor’s attention from the task at hand. Collective task performance is 
constrained further by the number of individual actors assigned to each task, the magnitude of the 
task, and both scheduled (e.g., work breaks, ends of shifts, weekends and holidays) and 
unscheduled (e.g., awaiting managerial decisions, awaiting work or information inputs from 
others, performing rework) downtime. 
The second implication is computational: both primary work (e.g., planning, design, 
operations) and coordination work (e.g., group tasks, meetings, joint problem solving) are 
modeled in terms of work volume. This construct is used to represent a unit of work (e.g., 
associated with a task, a meeting, a communication) within the task structure. In addition to 
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symbolic execution of VDT models (e.g., qualitatively assessing skill mismatches, task-
concurrency difficulties, decentralization effects) through micro-behaviors derived from 
Organization Theory, the discrete-event simulation engine enables (virtual) process performance 
to be assessed quantitatively (e.g., projecting task duration, cost, rework, process quality). 
Current VDT technological work and research vectors are described in parallel with this present 





Figure 2 Hierarchy Organization – Industrial Age Mission & Environment 
 
Here we summarize how the VDT modeling environment is used to represent the Hierarchy and 
Edge organizations. And we detail the experimental manipulations formulated to test the 
comparative performance of these competing organizational forms. Beginning with the 
representation, a commercial version of the VDT modeling environment, called SimVision [55], is 
used for modeling and experimentation here. Using our characterization above for the archetypes 
Machine Bureaucracy and Professional Adhocracy, we parameterize the Hierarchy and Edge 
organizations, respectively, according to both the mapping in Table 2 and to characterizations of 
Industrial Age and 21st Century mission-environmental contexts. Table 3 summarizes the three 
structural factors (Column 1) and parameter settings for the Hierarchy (Column 2) and Edge 
(Column 3) organizations. In Appendices A and B, we include detailed discussion of both 
organizations, addressing each structural factor and model parameter setting in turn. To preserve 
continuity for the non-modeler, the discussion here remains at a relatively high level. Definitions 
of modeling concepts, terms and variables are included in Appendix C for reference. 
Figure 2 depicts a SimVision screenshot for the Hierarchy organization. Mission tasks are 
represented by rectangular boxes. The same four mission tasks are used in representing both the 
Hierarchy and Edge computational models: 1) suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) 
(labeled “Air Missions 1”), 2) Amphibious Assault (labeled “Surface Missions”), 3) Ground 
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Invasion (labeled “Ground Missions”), and 4) close air support (CAS) (labeled “Air Missions 2”). 
Task sequencing in the figure is represented by dark precedence links between tasks. Following 
current doctrine, the Hierarchy organization plans and executes its operational tasks in two, 
sequential phases of two tasks each, with a milestone symbol (labeled “Phase 2 Ready”) 
separating the two. Dashed lines between tasks represent rework links. Rework is required to 
correct mistakes made in one particular mission task (e.g., SEAD) that impact the performance of 
another (e.g., CAS). No communication links are included in this model of the Hierarchy, because 
task interdependence is predominately pooled and sequential [58]. 
 
 
Figure 3 Edge Organization – Industrial Age Mission & Environment 
 
Actors are represented by person icons (e.g., labeled “Commander”). Notice the three-
level hierarchy among the actors at the top of the screenshot. This depicts Command, 
Coordination and Operations levels in the JTF Hierarchy. Correspondence to the Strategic Apex, 
Middle Line (and staff functions) and Operating Core, respectively, should be clear. Links 
between actors and tasks represent job responsibilities. Operations level actors (e.g., labeled “Air 
A,” “Surface,” “Ground”) are responsible directly for the four mission tasks. The Command (e.g., 
labeled “Commander”) and Coordination (e.g., labeled “Air Cdr,” “Cdr Staff”) level actors are 
responsible only indirectly for such mission tasks. But they have their own work tasks (labeled 
“Command Tasks” and “Staff Tasks” in the figure). These are unique to the Hierarchy model. 
Notice also the trapezoidal shape labeled “Command Meetings.” These represent daily, face-to-
face meetings and are unique also to the Hierarchy model. Again, considerable, additional 
modeling detail is presented in Appendix A. 
Figure 3 depicts a SimVision screenshot for the Edge organization. The same 
representational scheme described above in terms of Figure 2 applies here. But notice the 
dramatic difference from the Hierarchy screenshot above. Here, many mission tasks are 
scattered all over, performed concurrently, and interconnected richly with both rework and 
communication links. Remember, the mission tasks are the same here as for the Hierarchy 
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above. The difference is, the Edge organization undertakes most parts of all four missions 
concurrently—with only a small number of sequentially dependent tasks—composing itself from 
16 smaller units to accomplish different parts when and as appropriate. Also, no organizational 
hierarchy is present. Nor is there a separate set of Command and Staff tasks or daily Command 
briefings. Because of empowerment in the Edge organization, leader demands—although still 
present—are embedded within coordination requirements of the many different actors. And the 
leaders themselves emerge, informally and implicitly, during mission execution. Edge units are 
also coupled tightly together, exhibiting reciprocal interdependence [58]. Diverse units are 
responsible for various mission tasks and coordinate with one another via mutual adjustment. As 
with the Hierarchy above, considerable, additional modeling detail is presented in Appendix B. 
 
Experimental manipulations. Experimental manipulations are used to characterize different 
mission-environmental, infrastructural, and knowledge contexts in which the Hierarchy and Edge 
organizations represented above are required to perform and operate. Three such manipulations 
are listed in Table 4. Using our computational modeling tools, each manipulation can be 
conducted independently to isolate separate effects, or they can be conducted collectively to 
emulate cumulative effects. We also label two alternate scenarios corresponding to each context: 
“Industrial Age” and “21st Century.” Entries in the table below summarize how each of the three 
experimental manipulations is specified, across the two alternate scenarios, for two contrasting 
organizational forms. In design terms, this represents a full factorial, 3 x 2 x 2 experiment. As 
above, definitions of modeling concepts, terms and variables are included in Appendix C for 
reference. 
 
Table 4 Manipulations of Experimental Factors 
Manipulation Industrial Age 21st Century 
Mission & 
Environmental 
Context (P1, 5) 
 
- Medium complexity  
- Med requirement complexity 
- Med solution complexity 
- Med uncertainty 
- Conventional tasks 
- Same FEP 
- Same PEP  
 
- High complexity  
- High requirement complexity 
- High solution complexity 
- High uncertainty 
- Challenging tasks 
- Higher FEP 






- Hierarchy settings 
- Low bandwidth 
- Noise (0.3) 
 
- Networked 
- Edge settings 
- High bandwidth 
- Noise (0.01) 
Professional 
Competency (P2, 4) 
 
- Cumulative learning 
- Higher application experience 
- Personnel rotation 
- Lower skill level 
- Low team experience 
- Marginal learning 
- Lower application experience 
- Personnel rotation 
- Higher skill level 
- High team experience 
 
The first manipulation is labeled “Mission & Environmental Context” and derives 
principally from Propositions 1 and 5 above. Following [8] in part, we depict this context as one of 
“medium complexity” for the Industrial Age scenario. Clearly complexity is relative. Even a 
“medium” complexity military operation such as characteristic of Hierarchy and Edge 
organizations would be considered “very complex” with respect to most organizations in the 
world. But within our experimental design, use the level medium here principally for contrast with 
the alternate, 21st Century scenarioi. We specify medium complexity via two model parameters: 
requirement complexity and solution complexity. The same holds for uncertainty, which we 
specify here as “medium” in like manner. We label the difficulty of tasks in the Industrial Age 
scenario “conventional,” which depicts a set of relatively routine and analyzable problems [50] to 
be solved. In the 21st Century scenario, however, tasks are envisioned to be much more 
challenging. Hence we use higher levels for error parameters (i.e., FEP, PEP; see Appendices). 
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The second manipulation is labeled “Network Architecture” and derives principally from 
Propositions 2 and 3. Following [1, 20, 38] here, as well as [8, 46], we characterize the Industrial 
Age scenario one of a “stovepiped” architecture, in which networks, processes and cultural norms 
support principally vertical communication within functional “silos” or “chimneys.” This is 
reinforced by our characterization of the Machine Bureaucracy organization structure above. 
Where the Hierarchy organization is run in this scenario, we make no adjustments to the 
organization structure parameters (e.g., centralization, formalization and matrix strength) 
described above. But when the Edge organization is run in this Industrial Age scenario, we modify 
the appropriate structure factors to make it behave in a more centralized and formal manner. The 
Industrial Age network architecture is characterized also in terms of “low bandwidth.” Again as 
above, bandwidth is relative. But many military combatants in the air, at sea and on the ground 
have much poorer bandwidth than most land-based organizations do. Following [8] in part, we 
specify this situation using noise and include a relatively high level (0.3) in the Industrial Age 
scenario. The levels summarized in Table 4 for the 21st Century scenario reflect consistently a 
more robust and capable network architecture. 
The third manipulation is labeled “Professional Competency” and derives principally from 
Propositions 2 and 4. Professional competency pertains to how knowledgeable people, groups 
and organizations are with respect to their organizations, missions and environments. In the 
Industrial Age scenario, people, teams and organizations are able to develop extreme degrees of 
proficiency with the specific, limited set of missions and environments that they plan, generally 
well in advance, to encounter. Education and training are extensive. And the Military has 
accumulated and documented vast amounts of doctrine to formalize organizational learning along 
these lines. We represent this with higher values for the parameter application experience. 
Conversely, people in Industrial Age military organizations change jobs frequently (e.g., every 2 – 
3 years). This makes it difficult for individuals to develop high skills specific to any particular job. 
We specify this effect through lower values for the parameter skill level. This frequent job rotation 
makes it difficult also for teams to develop long-term, cohesive bonds—which affect trust—and 
the kind of deep familiarity and understanding that comes only through tacit learning over 
extended periods of time (see [45]). We specify this effect through low team experience.  
The levels summarized in Table 4 for the 21st Century scenario reflect a mix of effects 
with respect to those specified for its Industrial Age counterpart. Because the organization as a 
whole stresses agility over efficacy or efficiency [1, p. 180], it must prepare for a much wider 
variety of diverse missions and environments than its counterparts do. This offsets in part the kind 
of cumulative learning noted above and renders the organization in a situation requiring rapid 
learning on the margin for each, distinct mission. We specify this effect by lowering application 
experience by one level. Conversely, agility calls for relatively small, experienced, cohesive units 
that can self-organize into larger compositions of units and can self-synchronize their operations 
dynamically. Our interpretation of this is that less personnel rotation across units will become the 
norm (e.g., as it is in many knowledge organizations such as universities). As above, we specify 
this effect by raising skill level by one level and by parameterizing team experience at “high.” 
 
Results 
In this section, we include a sample of preliminary, experimental results produced using the 
computational models and experimental design outlined in the study. Such results represent only 
a sample, because we have not yet conducted the full-factorial, 3 x 2 x 2 experiment outlined 
above. Our primary purpose in this article is to specify computational models of Hierarchy and 
Edge organizations. Conducting the experiment represents our next step in terms of imminent 
future researchii. Nonetheless, we include some preliminary results to illustrate the use and utility 
of computational experimentation. Specifically, here we evaluate emulated organizational 
performance via simple, 2 x 2 experimental design: both Hierarchy and Edge organizations are 
assessed in both Industrial Age and 21st Century mission-environmental contexts. Notice this 
represents the top row of Table 4 above. Preliminary results are summarized in Table 5. We 
address the two mission-environmental scenarios in turn. 
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227 days 223 days 314 days 235 days 
Cost 
 
$12B $9B $16B $10B 
Project Risk 
 
0.36 0.78 0.36 0.78 
Max Backlog 24 days 
(Commander) 
 








830K days 819K days 830K days 819K days 
Rework Volume 
 
131K days 113K days 422K days 166K days 
Coordination 
Volume 
15K days 186K days 40K days 227K days 
Decision Wait 
Volume 
62K days 0K days 184K days 0K days 
 
 
Industrial Age Mission-Environmental Scenario 
Column 1 of the table includes eight measures used here to summarize and report the results. 
Column 2 includes values for the Hierarchy Organization in the Industrial Age (HOIA) scenario. 
This can be considered as a baseline for comparison with the other organization-scenario results. 
The other three columns pertain to results from the remaining cells of our 2 x 2 experimental 
design. In the first two rows, the measures duration and cost quantify, respectively, the length of 
time (expressed here in days of calendar time) and cost (expressed here in billions of dollarsiii) 
required for performance of a mission. For instance, in the case of the baseline (HOIA) scenario, 
simulated duration and cost are 227 days and $12B, respectively.  
 Project risk is a measure of project-level tasks left incomplete at the end of a mission. 
Clearly some tasks are more important than others are, and it is unnecessary often to complete 
100% of all assigned tasks. But the more tasks that remain incomplete, the higher the risk of 
missing an important one and jeopardizing mission success. Hence this measure provides a 
gauge of mission risk. It is expressed as the fraction of total effort (e.g., work, cost) that would 
have to be expended, in addition to the time and cost incurred for mission performance, to 
perform the remaining work and coordination tasks that were left incomplete at the end of a 
mission. For instance, the first scenario value of 0.36 indicates that an additional 36% of time and 
cost would be required to complete all of the tasks left undone at the end of the mission. 
 Maximum backlog represents the magnitude of assigned work that accumulates over 
time in the in-box or queue of a particular actor in the model. It is a measure (expressed here in 
work days) of how far behind the actor is at the peak. The further behind one gets (i.e., larger 
work backlog), the more difficult it is for the actor to attend to even very important tasks at hand, 
to coordinate with others, and to make decisions that are important to guide other actors’ work 
tasks. In this scenario, the Commander actor accumulates progressively greater backlog over 
time and experiences a peak value of 24 days in Month 4. This phenomenon is characteristic of 
centralized organization and decision making. 
 Work volume is described above as a construct used to measure the magnitude of work 
tasks performed by each actor. The values reported in the table (expressed here in thousands of 
work days) reflect accumulated totals of all tasks performed by all actors. The value for our 
scenario is 830K days. Notice this value is much higher than the 227 days duration reported 
above. Because multiple actors perform their tasks concurrently, many thousands of days of work 
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volume can be accomplished on each calendar day. Consider, for instance, if 1000 people work 
for one day to complete a mission component. The elapsed calendar time (i.e., 1 day) would be 
reported by the measure duration, and the magnitude of effort (i.e., 1000 work days or 1K day) 
would be reported by the measure work volume.  
The other three “volume” measures—rework, coordination and decision wait—are 
expressed in the same units. Rework measures the magnitude of effort expended on fixing 
mistakes. The value for our scenario is 131K days; that is, in addition to the 830K days of direct 
work reported above, actors in this scenario expend the equivalent of another 131K days of effort 
on rework. Coordination measures the magnitude of effort expended on communicating and 
coordinating between actors. The value for our scenario is 15K days; that is, in addition to the 
830K days of direct work reported above, actors in this scenario expend the equivalent of another 
15K days of effort on coordination. Decision wait measures the magnitude of time spent by actors 
waiting for decisions to be made. The value for our scenario is 62K days; that is, in addition to the 
830K days of direct work reported above, actors in this scenario expend the equivalent of another 
62K days waiting for decisions to be made. These values are all reflective of a Hierarchy 
performing in mission-environmental conditions that are characteristic of the Industrial Age 
Military. 
 In terms of comparison, notice the Edge organization performs the same mission tasks, 
in this same Industrial Age scenario (EOIA), in almost the identical length of time (i.e., 223 days). 
Indeed, the two duration values are statistically indistinguishable from one another. Hence in this 
scenario, the Hierarchy and Edge organizations perform their missions equally quickly. But the 
Edge organization performs its mission tasks for three-fourths the cost (i.e., $9B) incurred by the 
Hierarchy. The lower cost reflects in part the absence of Command Headquarters and staff 
functions. The lower volume of rework for the Edge (i.e., 113 vs. 131K days) contributes in part 
also to the lower cost, as the Edge organization invests less time and effort in reworking mistakes 
than the Hierarchy does.  
Alternatively, notice the Edge experiences over twice the project risk of the Hierarchy 
(i.e., 0.78 vs. 0.36). Recall this measures the magnitude of tasks that are left incomplete at the 
end of a mission. When compared with the Hierarchy, the Edge organization—relying on 
concurrent and decentralized mission execution—leaves more incomplete tasks left to be done 
and hence experiences greater risk to mission success. Here the results point to the Edge 
concept representing a metaphorical two-edge sword: missions are accomplished more cheaply 
but with greater risk. Such tension between cost and risk is consistent with previous empirical 
results (e.g., see [46]). The leader or manager must decide for him or herself what kinds of 
tradeoffs between these competing performance measures are appropriate. 
 The maximum backlog of the Edge organization (i.e., 14 days for the Ground A units) is 
nearly half that experienced by the Hierarchy Commander (i.e., 24 days). This reflects the 
relatively autonomous and distributed, self-organizing and self-synchronizing nature of Edge 
organizations. But still, interdependencies between different units and mission tasks require 
coordination, information seeking and decision making, which can cause work to back up in any 
organization. Notice the work volume is a bit smaller for the Edge organization than for the 
Hierarchy (i.e., 819 vs. 830K days). The volume of mission tasks (i.e., performed by the 
Operating Core) is the same for both organizations. The difference reflects principally that of 
Command Headquarters and staff functions in the Hierarchy.  
In contrast with the lower rework volume discussed above, the coordination volume for 
the Edge organization is an order of magnitude greater than for the Hierarchy (i.e., 186 vs. 15K 
days). This reflects the tremendous time and energy required to coordinate and control 
distributed, decentralized, concurrent, reciprocally interdependent work activities. Finally, notice 
the Edge organization experiences zero decision wait volume. Actors in the Edge organization do 
not wait around for Commanders and others to make decisions. Rather, they do the best that they 
can with the knowledge and skills that they possess or can acquire quickly. This contributes in 
part to the somewhat faster mission execution speed and considerably lower execution cost. But 
it is offset in part by higher mission risk and order-of-magnitude greater coordination effort. 
In all, comparing emulated performance of the Hierarchy and Edge organizations across 
this set of eight measures, one cannot say definitively that one organizational form or the other is 
“better.” Better is in the eye of the beholder (i.e., is constructed socially) and depends upon what 
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performance factors are considered to be important by Stakeholders who matter. For instance, if 
mission cost (e.g., consider factors such as budget deficits, weapon system recapitalization, and 
Social Security funding needs) is paramount, then one would consider the Edge organization to 
represent a superior choice in this Industrial Age scenario. Alternatively, if mission risk (e.g., 
consider factors such as collateral damage, casualties, and political embarrassment) is key, then 
one would consider the Hierarchy to represent a more conservative choice. Again, both 
organizational forms have their relative advantages and disadvantages, and both perform the 
same Industrial Age missions at equivalent speeds. The choice is dependent upon Stakeholders’ 
relative utilities and preferences. 
 
21st Century Mission-Environmental Scenario 
Quite unlike the results reported and discussed above for the Industrial Age mission-
environmental scenario, in this 21st Century emulation of comparative organizational 
performance, the Edge organization completes its mission tasks roughly a third faster (e.g., 235 
vs. 314 days) and much less expensively (e.g., $10 vs. 16B) than the Hierarchy does. Indeed, 
notice the Edge organization performs it missions in this demanding, 21st Century scenario almost 
as fast as the Hierarchy does in the comparatively simple, Industrial Age context (i.e., 235 vs. 227 
days). 
Further, the Edge organization’s performance does not degrade nearly as severely 
across scenarios. The Hierarchy performs much worse in this 21st Century scenario than it does 
in the Industrial Age mission-environmental context (e.g., 314 vs. 227 days, $16 vs. $12B). In 
contrast, the Edge organization’s performance degrades only by 5 – 10%. It is important to 
remember, the magnitude of operations-level work to be performed (e.g., as measured by work 
volume of the operating core) is the same across scenarios. Only the mission-environmental 
context changes. Alternatively, the Edge performance results continue to reflect much higher 
mission risk than those pertaining to the Hierarchy do. Even in the 21st Century scenario, a 
fundamental tension between cost and risk continues to hold. 
Notice how the magnitude of rework, coordination and decision wait time more than 
double and even triple for the Hierarchy organization across these two scenarios (i.e., 422 vs. 
131; 40 vs. 15; 184 vs. 62K days, respectively). This organization has a very difficult time 
operating in the 21st Century mission-environmental context. The Edge organization experiences 
sizeable increases in rework and coordination also (i.e., 166 vs. 113; 227 vs. 186K days). But it 
still experiences zero decision wait time. And the magnitude of increases in such measures grows 
more slowly in the Edge organization than in the Hierarchy. In mathematical terms, the first 
derivative is positive for both organizational forms (e.g., in terms of duration, cost, rework and 
coordination) as mission-environmental demands increase. But the second derivative appears to 
be quite different (e.g., considerably smaller for the Edge than for the Hierarchy) when comparing 
the alternate and contrasting organizational forms. We do not have enough results to plot or 
measure such derivatives, or to even determine their signs. But we can observe that the Edge 
organization appears to be more robust across scenarios. The more demanding that mission-
environmental contexts become, the more appropriate the Edge organization may prove to be. 
 
Conclusion 
The Edge represents a fresh approach to organizational design, moving knowledge and power to 
the edges of organizations. But this raises issues in terms of comparative performance with 
respect to alternate organizational designs (esp. military C2). The research described in this 
article represents the first stage of a multi-disciplinary, multi-year investigation into the design and 
efficacy of Edge organizations for current and future, military, mission-environmental contexts. 
Specifically, we employ methods and tools of computational experimentation to compare 
empirically the performance of current and competing organizational forms. In this closing 
section, we note multiple contributions to C2 research. We also suggest several insights and 
results that are amenable to immediate practical application. And we reveal key parts of an 
exciting agenda for continued research along the lines of this investigation. 
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Through this research, we illustrate how computational methods are able to mitigate 
problems experienced with both laboratory (e.g., external validity) and field (e.g., internal validity) 
research methods. Developing semi-formal, computational models also enables researchers to 
overcome much of the residual ambiguity inherent in natural language description. By committing 
to a parameterized, computational representation, researchers are able to be clear about exactly 
what they mean by terms such as centralization, uncertainty and interdependence, for instance. 
Through our discussion above, and the detailed appendices that follow, the Reader should be 
able to understand exactly how we have developed and specified the models of Hierarchy and 
Edge organizations discussed in this articleiv. This contributes to C2 research through theoretical 
clarity that is uncharacteristic for scholarly discourse in the military domain. 
 This first study begins by specifying computational models of Hierarchy and Edge 
organizations in the C2 domain. Rooted firmly in Organization Theory, yet cognizant of military 
operations, in this article we report the bases and results of such specification in considerable 
detail. Drawing from Organization Studies, we survey a large variety of organizational forms and 
illustrate the power of abstraction through organizational archetypes. And through our two-step 
approach to model development, we draw strongly from the literature to indicate the 
organizational archetypes that fit most closely the current conceptualizations of contemporary 
military C2 and Edge organizations. This contributes to C2 research by rooting such 
conceptualizations firmly in the literature. We contribute also to Organization Theory by 
articulating the “new” form Edge in a manner that is rooted firmly in the knowledge accumulated 
through its scholarly literature. 
Further, we design an experiment with three, orthogonal manipulations—mission-
environmental context, network architecture and professional competency—to compare explicitly 
the performance of two, competing, organizational forms—Hierarchy and Edge—across two, 
contrasting, mission-environmental scenarios—Industrial Age and 21st Century. The full-factorial, 
3 x 2 x 2 experimental design leverages our theoretically rooted organizational characterizations 
from above by identifying a set of essential properties pertaining to Edge organizations and by 
defining key propositions for their performance in the kind of 21st Century, mission-environmental 
context forecast for their efficacy. As with our commitment above to semi-formal, computational 
modeling, we also reduce residual ambiguity pertaining to how the future C2 mission-
environmental context is characterized. This contributes to C2 research by extending and refining 
current Edge conceptualizations and “theory,” respectively. 
Preliminary, experimental results reveal insightful dynamic patterns and differential 
performance capabilities of Hierarchy and Edge C2 organizations. We illustrate how Hierarchy 
and Edge organizational forms manifest qualitatively different behaviors when performing a 
common set of mission tasks in the military C2 domain. In the context of an Industrial Age 
mission and environment, Hierarchy and Edge organizations perform equivalently in terms of 
mission speed. But results reveal what appears to be a fundamental tension between mission 
cost and risk. We also illustrate fundamental differences between dynamic behaviors of these 
alternate and competing organizational forms, through performance measures such as rework, 
coordination, backlog and decision wait time. Together, these empirical measures, results and 
insights contribute to C2 research by illustrating the use and utility of computational 
experimentation and by quantifying empirical results of Hierarchy and Edge organizations 
performing head-to-head on contemporary C2 missions. 
Additionally, by comparing both Hierarchy and Edge organizations across contrasting 
mission-environmental scenarios, we elucidate how the Edge organization—as we have specified 
it here—appears to be more robust to increases in the demands, uncertainties and dynamics of 
different contextual scenarios. Here we contribute to C2 research in a major way: developing new 
contingency theory in this domain that both describes and explains—empirically—the 
organizational characteristics and behaviors contributing to fit with diverse mission-environmental 
contexts. This serves to add new theory that can be applied immediately and directly to practical 
problems in military C2. We contribute further by illuminating how one organizational form is not 
inherently or fundamentally “better” than another across all scenarios and in all circumstances. 
Hence the choice of one organizational form versus another depends most fundamentally upon 
which performance factors are considered to be most important by Stakeholders who matter. This 
serves to temper some of the hyperbole surrounding the Edge organizational form at present. 
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Nonetheless, the research described in this article represents just one, small step toward 
developing and accumulating new knowledge and applying it to improve organizational 
performance. Yet it represents an important step that opens up a rich array of future research. 
For instance, our imminent studies will focus on model validation in the field and on conducting 
computational experiments according to the full-factorial design described above. As other 
instances, in parallel with the present hypothesis-testing research, we are engaged also in theory-
building work in areas such as knowledge inventory measurement and optimization [35], 
intercultural organizational interactions and trust effects [21]. Additionally, we continue to develop 
and enhance the computational toolset to incorporate such theoretical developments [52]. And we 
employ other, existing computational tools such as a scholarship-based expert system to induce 
requirements and to delineate transformation pathways for Edge organizations [44]. We engage 
richly in fieldwork as well, both to develop new theory through ethnographic research and to 
apply, test and validate our models through examination of operational organizations in their real-
world environments. Because edge is defined by where organizations interact directly with their 
environments, for us to conduct cutting-edge research, the edge is where we need to be and 
where we intend to stay. 
Of course every study has limitations. Ours is clearly no exception. Computational 
experimentation is suited well to complement, not to replace, other research methods [46]. Plus, 
several aspects of our model conceptualization, specification and parameterization include 
admittedly substantial interpretation and judgment. And we have yet to take these computational 
models out into the field for calibration. But we employ demonstrated methods and validated 
tools. And we are committed to empirical validation in the field. Moreover, we encourage 
replication of our models and results to enhance reliability.  
Finally, even a first study such as this, offering only a sample of preliminary results, 
contributes to C2 research and provides new, valuable, immediately applicable insight. And we 
look forward to continuing our contributions to C2 knowledge through research. Moreover, as 
academic researchers in this military domain, we are committed to education and practical 
application as well as to theory development. In addition to conference presentation and journal 
publication, we hope to formalize new knowledge developed through Edge research into novel 
university and professional courses that can bring our contingency-theoretic results and insights 
down to the deck plate level—or in Edge parlance, to where and when it is needed most: at the 
edge. 
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Appendix A – Hierarchy Organization Model 
 
This appendix provides additional detail pertaining to specification of the Hierarchy organization 
model. Recall Table 3 above summarizes the three design factors (Column 1) and parameter 
settings for the Hierarchy (Column 2) and Edge (Column) organizations. We reproduce the 
Hierarchy portion of this summary as Table 6 below for reference and organize the discussion in 
terms of the three design factors. 
 
Table 6 Representation of the Hierarchy Organization 




- High centralization 
- High formalization 
- Low matrix strength 
- 3-level hierarchy 
- Command (PM): 3 FTE 
- Coordination (SL): 200 FTE 
- Operations (ST): 40,000 FTE 
- 4, large units 





- Vertical channels 
- “Wheel” structure 
- Few communication links 
- Information exchange (0.1) 
- Push communications 
- Low application experience 




- 4 operational tasks 
- Sequential execution (2-Ph) 
- Sequential interdependence 
- FEP (0.1)  
- PEP (0.1) 
- Leader demands extra 
- Work duration (3 months) 
- Loose coupling 
- Rework strength (0.3) 





Organization structure. We begin with organization structure factors from Table 2 such as 
coordination, specialization, formalization, grouping, and decentralization. For the Hierarchy, 
centralization and formalization are set to “high” levels, and matrix strength is set to “low.” These 
three parameters combine to form a suite of variables that have been used in prior work to 
characterize bureaucratic C2 organizations [Nissen & Buettner]. We include also a three-level 
managerial hierarchy to depict explicitly command (3 full-time equivalents (FTEs) to reflect a 
coalition type environment; this corresponds to the Strategic Apex), coordination (200 FTEs 
including both line and staff; this corresponds to the Middle Line and both Technical and Support 
Staffs), and operations (40,000v FTEs; this corresponds to the Operating Core) levels of the C2 
organization. Multiple, additional levels within each of these are represented implicitly as well, as 
the actors at each level are specified as collectivities; that is, each “actor” represents a collection 
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of people. Collectivity size increases geometrically with distance from the center (e.g., top of the 
hierarchy) and toward the edge (i.e., bottom of the hierarchy).  
 
Communication structure. Next we address the communication structure. Drawing from our 
theoretical characterization summarized in Table 2 above, the “few” versus “many throughout” 
liaison activities are represented here. For the Hierarchy, communications are principally vertical 
in nature, following the formal lines of hierarchical organization and authority. This representation 
is reinforced by the high centralization factor noted above in terms of structure. The 
communications configuration follows approximately the “wheel” structure (e.g., with two, nested 
“hubs”) described in [Carroll & Burton]. We represent this further through inclusion of only few 
communication links in the model. Communication links are depicted by the screenshot in 
Appendix B as connections between specific tasks (e.g., Command and Staff). Commensurately, 
we represent the Hierarchy as an organization with low information exchange (p = 0.1), which 
affects information processing corresponding to the communications links included. Push, 
broadcast style information dissemination is characteristic also of the Hierarchy. This complicates 
the information-processing tasks associated with searching for and learning important knowledge 
(e.g., learning what is necessary, when it is needed). We represent this with low application 
experience. Finally, many meetings (e.g., 2 hours daily for the Command, Coordination and Staff 
organizations; 10% allocation except for Command at 100%) are included to represent the 
manner in which high-level coordination is conducted principally today. 
 
Work structure. In terms of work structure, the representation for the Hierarchy organization is 
adapted from [Nissen & Buettner]. The work structure specifies principally what tasks need to be 
accomplished. For purposes of control in this computational experiment, both organizations are 
required to perform the same four operational tasks: 1) suppression of enemy air defenses 
(SEAD) Missions, 2) Surface Missions, 3) Ground Missions, and 4) close air support (CAS) 
Missions.  
Following current doctrine, the Hierarchy organization plans and executes its operational 
tasks in two, sequential phases of two tasks each (i.e., “2-Ph”). The first task of Phase 1, SEAD, 
follows current doctrine of attacking first enemy defenses and C2 capabilities to enable air 
superiority and debilitate an adversary’s coordination capabilities. Roughly three months of effort 
are planned for this task, to be accomplished by approximately 500 people. The second involves 
maritime interdiction, mine-clearing, shore bombardment, and like activities to get invasion forces 
ashore. Roughly three months of effort are planned for this task also, although it entails a much 
larger force of approximately 9000 people. This latter, surface mission can begin at the same time 
as the SEAD. But the two are loosely coupled and relatively independent (i.e., interdependence is 
pooled [Thompson]).  
When these first two missions are complete, the campaign reaches a milestone at which 
Phase 2 is ready to begin. The third task begins Phase 2 and involves ground missions to attack 
targets, weaken resistance, and capture territory. Roughly three months of effort are planned for 
this task. It entails a very large force of approximately 27,000 people.  The fourth mission, CAS, 
involves the use of aircraft to support ground forces. Roughly one month of effort is planned for 
this task, with approximately 500 people assigned. It begins at the same time as the Ground 
Mission but involves only loose coupling pooled interdependence. In this kind of loosely coupled, 
nearly independent work structure, we use relatively low values for the two error parameters: 
functional error probability (FEP = 0.1) and project error probability (PEP = 0.1). 
We also follow [Carroll-Burton] to include level-of-effort tasks that we label “Leader 
demands” in the table. These represent activities and priorities (e.g., coordinating with 
Headquarters, staff work, organizational maintenance) beyond the four mission tasks above. 
Such demands are heavy in the Hierarchy, as even Battle Theater Commanders in a Machine 
Bureaucracy must spend great time attending to people above, below and lateral to themselves. 
The command actors have one such leader task, and the staff organizations work jointly on 
another. The work duration used to specify this effort is 3 months for both. Complexity and 
uncertainty are specified as “medium” for this kind of work.  
Finally, loose coupling characterizes the Hierarchy, as failure dependencies between 
different tasks are relatively weak. We specify this using the rework links shown in Figure 2, with 
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relatively high rework strength (0.3) in the case of the Hierarchy. This reflects the importance of 
good performance at each stage of a sequentially dependent workflow. Further, in the Hierarchy, 
we include rework links to the Staff leader demands activity from each of the four mission tasks. 
This represents the manner in which staff organizations must respond to the progress, exceptions 
and uncertainties pertaining to the warfare tasks. It represents also how command staffs are 
stressed by operational activities.  
 
Appendix B – Edge Organization Model 
 
This appendix provides additional detail pertaining to specification of the Hierarchy organization 
model. Recall Table 3 above summarizes the three design factors (Column 1) and parameter 
settings for the Hierarchy (Column 2) and Edge (Column) organizations. We reproduce the Edge 
portion of this summary as Table 7 below for reference and organize the discussion in terms of 
the three design factors. 
 
Table 7 Representation of the Edge Organization 




- Low centralization 
- Low formalization 
- High matrix strength 
- 1-level meritocracy 
- Command (PM): 0 FTE 
- Coordination (SL): 0 FTE 
- Operations (ST): 40,000 FTE 
- 16, smaller units 





- Horizontal network 
- “Circle” structure 
- Many communication links 
- Information exchange (0.9)  
- Post & smart pull 
- Med application experience 
- P2P communications 
Work Structure 
 
- 16 operational subtasks 
- Concurrent execution 
- Reciprocal interdependence 
- FEP (0.2)  
- PEP (0.2) 
- Leader demands emergent 
- Work duration (0) 
- Tight coupling 
- Rework strength (0.1) 




Organization structure. We begin with organization structure factors from Table 2 such as 
coordination, specialization, formalization, grouping, and decentralization. In contrast to the 
Hierarchy above, the Edge organization has opposite settings for these three parameters and 
only a single-level meritocracy; that is, no one is designated ex-ante as being “in charge.” The 
parameter settings are consistent with our Professional Adhocracy characterization of the Edge 
organization. And the flattened hierarchy and meritocracy depict the kinds of peer-to-peer 
coordination and emergent leadership characterized in current Edge conceptualizations. The 
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same total number of people is included in the operating core of both the Edge and Hierarchy 
organizations. But the number of separate units is four times larger in the Edge organization than 
in the Hierarchy. This represents the theoretical difference in terms of unit size (i.e., large for 
Machine Bureaucracy, small for Professional Adhocracy). Similarly, we represent training and 
indoctrination the same way for both Hierarchy and Edge organizations: by specifying the same, 
“medium” skill levels (i.e., adequate for the tasks at hand) for actors.  
 
Communication structure. Next we address the communication structure. Drawing from our 
theoretical characterization summarized in Table 2 above, the “few” versus “many throughout” 
liaison activities are represented here. In contrast with the Hierarchy, the Edge organization is 
represented differently. A horizontal communication network, comprised of lateral 
communications, is reinforced by the low centralization factor noted above in terms of structure. 
The communications configuration follows approximately the “circle” structure (e.g., 3, 
interconnected circles for Air, Surface and Ground mission tasks) described in [Carroll & Burton]. 
This represents an intermediate configuration between centralized communications (e.g., “wheel”) 
and a fully connected network (e.g., where everyone communicates with everyone else). We 
represent this further through inclusion of many communication links in the model. See the 
screenshot in Appendix C. Commensurately, we represent the Edge as an organization with high 
information exchange (p = 0.9), which affects information processing corresponding to the 
communications links included. Post-and-smart-pull communication is characteristic also of the 
Edge. This facilitates the information-processing tasks associated with searching for and learning 
important knowledge (e.g., learning what is necessary, when it is needed). We represent this with 
medium application experience. Peer-to-peer (P2P) communications, on demand, characterize 
the Edge approach to coordination without Command-level meetings every day. 
 
Work structure. In terms of work structure, the representation for the Hierarchy organization is 
adapted from [Nissen & Buettner]. The work structure specifies principally what tasks need to be 
accomplished. For purposes of control in this computational experiment, both organizations are 
required to perform the same four operational tasks: 1) suppression of enemy air defenses 
(SEAD) Missions, 2) Surface Missions, 3) Ground Missions, and 4) close air support (CAS) 
Missions.  
In contrast with the Hierarchy, the work structure for the Edge organization is different 
entirely. The Edge organization undertakes most parts of all four missions concurrently, 
composing itself from 16 smaller units to accomplish different parts when and as appropriate. And 
performance of most mission tasks is concurrent: only a small number of tasks are dependent 
sequentially (i.e., Air Missions 2 follow Air Missions 1D; Ground Missions E follow Ground 
Missions D, which follow Surface Missions E; Surface Missions A follow Air Missions 1A; and Air 
Missions 2 start with Ground Missions E). This difference can be observed by visual comparison 
of the work structures depicted in Figures 2 and 3. The successor links emphasize the concurrent 
nature of work tasks and the difference of this arrangement from that described and delineated 
above for the Hierarchy. The communication links noted above reinforce this difference, as they 
represent tight coupling and a preponderance of reciprocal task interdependence in the Edge 
work, which requires coordination via mutual adjustment [Thompson]. This represents a contrast 
with the preponderance of pooled and sequential interdependence in the Hierarchy, the 
coordination of which can be accomplished via standardization and planning, respectively. Notice 
this is consistent with our theoretical characterization [Mintzberg] of coordination differences in 
Table 2. In this kind of tightly coupled, highly interdependent work structure, we use higher values 
for the error parameters: (FEP = 0.2; PEP = 0.2). 
In further contrast with the Hierarchy, because of empowerment in the Edge organization, 
leader demands—although still present—are emergent from within the coordination requirements 
of the many different actors. Hence no additional task or work duration is specified for such 
activity. However, the model emulates the effects through dynamic communication, coordination 
and decision making between actors. Additionally, the Edge organization exhibits much tighter 
coupling between tasks than the Hierarchy does, and it has correspondingly denser failure 
dependencies. Indeed, a rework link is included between every activity that shares a 
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communications link. But a lower rework strength (0.1) is used to represent the positive effects of 
coordination via mutual adjustment as opposed to planning and sequential execution.  
In final contrast with the Hierarchy, the Edge organization does not have command and staff 
organizations. 
 
Appendix C – Model Parameter Definitions 
In this appendix, we both paraphrase and quote from [SV online help] to include definitions of the 
model elements and parameters that are discussed above and applicable to the computational 
experimentation reported in this study.  
Activity-See Task.  
Actor-See Position.  
Application experience-A measure of how familiar the position or person is with similar projects.  
Behavior file-A file that specifies the simulator's default behavior, such as how much rework to 
add to tasks with exceptions.  
Centralization-A measure of how centralized the decision-making is in a project. For example, 
high centralization indicates that most decisions are made and exceptions handled by top 
managerial positions such as the Project Manager. Low centralization means decisions are made 
by individual responsible positions.  
Communication-The passing of information between positions about tasks.  
Communications link-A dashed green link that links two tasks, indicating that the position 
responsible for the first task must communicate with the other position during or at the completion 
of the first task.  
Coordination-A combination of the information exchange generated by communication and 
meetings.  
Coordination Volume-The predicted time during a project or program that all positions spend at 
meetings and processing information requests from other positions.  
Critical path-The set of tasks in a project that determine the total project duration. Lengthening 
any of the tasks on the critical path lengthens the project duration.  
Decision wait time-The time a position waits for a response from the supervisor about how to 
handle an exception, plus any time the position waits for exception resolution before making the 
decision by default. See also Wait Volume.  
Exception-A situation detected by the simulator where part of a task requires additional 
information or a decision, or generates an error that may need correcting.  
Exception handling-Involves positions reporting exceptions to supervisors and supervisors 
making decisions on how to deal with the exceptions.  
Failure dependency link-See Rework link.  
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Formalization-A measure of the formality of communication in an organization. For example, 
high formalization indicates that most communication occurs in formal meetings.  
FRI (Functional Risk Index)-A measure of the likelihood that components produced by a project 
have defects. Also called CQI, or Component Quality Index.  
Full-time equivalent (FTE)-A measure of position or person availability to perform a task. For 
example, a position with an FTE value of 3 has the equivalent of 3 full-time employees to perform 
tasks.  
Functional exception-An error that causes rework in a task but does not affect any dependent 
tasks.  
Links-A set of color-coded arrows that represent the relationships between shapes.  
Matrix Strength-A measure of the level of supervision in a project or program, and a reflection of 
the structure of the organization. Low matrix strength means that positions are located in skill-
based functional departments and supervised directly by functional managers. High matrix 
strength means positions are co-located with other skill specialists in dedicated project teams and 
have project supervision from a Project Manager.  
Meeting-A gathering of positions to communicate about the project and project tasks.  
Meeting Participant link-A dashed grey line that links a position to a meeting, indicating that the 
position must attend the meeting.  
Milestone-A point in a project or program where a major business objective is completed.  
Model-A visual representation of a program and its projects.  
Noise-The probability that a position is distracted from assigned tasks.  
Organization-A group of departments that staff a program or project.  
Organization Assignment link-A solid pink line that links an organization to a project within a 
program.  
PM-Project Manager, the position that assumes overall responsibility for a project.  
Position-An abstract group representing one or more FTEs (full-time equivalents) that performs 
work and processes information. In a staffed project, positions represent a person or a group of 
persons.  
PRI (Project Risk Index)-A measure of the likelihood that components produced by a project will 
not be integrated at the end of the project, or that the integration will have defects. PRI is thus a 
measure of the success of system integration.  
Primary Assignment link-A solid blue line that links a position to a primary task, which is a task 
that takes priority over any secondary assignments.  
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Program-A set of related projects that share dependencies and together achieve the client's 
business objectives. A program also includes the associated responsible organizations, 
milestones, and relationships between projects.  
Project-A project represents work an organization must perform to achieve a major business 
milestone. The work is represented by tasks, milestones, the positions that perform tasks, 
meetings, and the dependencies between all these elements. While a model may contain 
numerous projects, it need only contain one. Each project in a model supports the goal of the 
program to which the project belongs.  
Project exceptions-Errors that might cause rework in a driver task and all its dependent tasks.  
Project Exception Rate-The probability that a subtask will fail and generate rework for failure 
dependent tasks. This probability is generally in the range 0.01 (low) to 0.10 (significant, but 
common). If the Project Exception Rate is greater than about 0.20, so much rework can be 
generated that the project may never finish.  
Project Successor link-A solid black line that links a project to another project or to a project 
milestone.  
Rework-Redoing all or part of a task. Compare with direct work.  
Rework Cost-The predicted cost of rework, or rework volume weighted by average cost per FTE 
of positions that do rework.  
Rework link-A dashed red line that links a task to a dependent task that will need rework if the 
driver task fails.  
Rework Volume-The predicted time needed for all positions on a project to do the required 
rework.  
Scenario-See Case.  
Secondary Assignment link-A dashed blue line that links a position to a secondary task, which 
is a task that can be worked whenever the position is not working on a primary task.  
Simulator-Software that simulates the work done by positions as they perform individual project 
tasks, including both planned direct work and coordination and rework.  
Simulation charts-Charts that summarize and provide details of the simulated performance of 
the program and the individual modeled projects.  
Successor link-A solid black line that links milestones and tasks.  
Supervision link-A solid black line that links a supervisory position to its supervised position.  
Task-Any work that consumes time, can generate communications or exceptions, and is required 
for project completion.  
VFP (Verification Failure Probability)-The probability that an exception will be generated for a 
task. The VFP is calculated during simulation based on a number of factors, including noise, 
communication rates, and team experience.  
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Wait Volume-A measure of the cumulative time spent by positions waiting for decisions to be 
made in a project.  






                                                 
i The static level may not reflect excellent face validity in either representation when examined 
alone, but the relative effects of the differences—when the two scenarios are examined 
comparatively—are likely to be preserved faithfully through dynamic behavioral emulation. Here 
we trade off some static validity to ensure valid dynamic behaviors. 
ii The reason stems from validation concerns. In addition to the bottom-up, theoretically driven 
model specification effort that constitutes the focus of this article, we need to also perform some 
top-down, empirically driven model validation and calibration work in the field. Because C2 
represents a relatively new domain for VDT application, such additional effort is important to 
ensure that dynamic behaviors of our computational models are representative of those exhibited 
by operational C2 organizations in the field. Nonetheless, as noted above, the VDT modeling 
environment has undergone extensive field validation in other domains (e.g., power plant 
construction and offshore drilling, see [Christiansen 1993]; aerospace, see [Thomsen 1998]; 
software development, see [Nogueira 2000]; healthcare, see [Cheng and Levitt 2001]; others). 
Hence we feel comfortable presenting these preliminary results to illustrate the use and utility of 
computational experimentation. 
iii These are relative values, not absolute cost estimates. They are useful for comparison across 
scenarios. This reflects the validation of the model to represent the correct directions and relative 
effects of performance variables across different scenarios. But do these cost figures do not 
purport to reflect the right orders of magnitude. Additional effort to push beyond model validation 
(i.e., get the direction and relative effects right) and to calibrate it (i.e., get the absolute values 
right) represent items on our agenda for future research. 
iv We will be happy to send copies of the SimVision model files upon request. The Reader must 
obtain his or her own copy of SimVision or comparable software to run the models. 
v Because these values are very large with respect to the SimVision software, we reduce 
proportionately the number of FTEs and the corresponding work volumes for the operations level 
actors and tasks, respectively. This has negligible effect on the results when compared across 
cases. 
